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SURROGATE MOTHERING: MEDICAL
REALITY IN A LEGAL VACUUM
"And this," said the Director opening
the door, "is the fertilizing room."'
Mankind is on the brink of biological revolution. Research in the
area of human reproduction is expanding man's knowledge and
presents a new found ability to control, manipulate, and direct man-
kind's reproductive processes. The exploding technology surrounding
human reproduction brings man to a critical threshold in his history.
Although reproductive technology can be used to correct infirmities in
man's reproductive system, it may also threaten society by disrupting
natural human relationships. Surrogate mothering is an example of a
technological development which offers this choice. Stated simply, sur-
rogate mothering is a procedure by which a woman produces a child
for a couple or a single person by becoming impregnated without en-
gaging in sexual intercourse, carrying the fetus to term, and then sur-
rendering the child for adoption.2
Our present legal system has not adequately addressed the
problems presented by surrogate mothering. Legislation which regu-
lates the practice is nonexistent. Although there have been few court
cases concerning surrogate mothering,3 as the practice becomes more
prevalent, litigation is certain to increase. The interrelated and com-
plex problems demand both scholarly and legislative attention. Some
examples include the surrogate relationship under adultery laws, the
illegitimacy of offspring, and the enforceability of the surrogate con-
tract. In addition, the parameters of the relationship between surrogate
mother, adopting mother, and child must be defined.
Legislators must confront the legal and social issues that such novel
biomedical procedures as surrogate mothering create. Unless legisla-
tors familiarize themselves with the potential consequences of surrogate
mothering and draft specific legislation outlining the rights and obliga-
tions of all involved parties, a chaotic patchwork of judicial decisions
will result.
The purpose of this note is to highlight concerns which legislators
must confront in proposing legislation for the regulation of surrogate
mothering. This note discusses child support, adultery, illegitimacy,
1. A. HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD 1 (1932). Authors dealing with science fiction and social-
political themes have long recognized the implications of scientifically controlled reproduc-
tion.
2. See notes 6-16 infra and accompanying text.
3. Doe v. Kelley, 11979-1981] REP. HUMAN REPRO. L. (Legal-Med. Studies) I1-B-15 (Wayne
County, Mich. Cir. Ct. Jan. 28, 1980).
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freedom of contract, and rights of privacy as they relate to surrogate
mothering. Also considered are the social and psychological effects of
surrogate mothering. It is imperative that legislators understand these
problems in order to formulate legislative policy regarding surrogate
mothering.
I. SURROGATE MOTHERING UNDER CURRENT LAW
The historically low number of children available for adoption has
been attributed to liberalized abortion laws and the fading social
stigma attached to illegitimacy.' A couple often waits three to seven
years for an infant to become available for adoption.' One alternative
recently made available is surrogate mothering. Surrogate mothering
requires the child-seeking couple to locate a woman who is willing to
become impregnated, carry the fetus to term, and surrender the child to
the couple after delivery. A surrogate may be located by a variety of
means, including a surrogate parenting institution,6 an attorney,7 or
private solicitation.8 Generally, the child-seeking couple will formalize
the relationship with the surrogate in a contract9 and adopt the child in
legal proceedings. 0
Surrogate mothering is classified into two distinct types. The first
4. Podulski, Abolishing Baby Buying Limiting Independent Adoption Placement, 9 FAM. L.Q.
547 (1975); see U.S. Bureau of the Census, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES:
1979, at 358 (100 ed. 1979); see also Turano, Black-Market Adoptions, 22 CAT. LAW. 48
(1976), in which the author attributes the reduced number of adoptable infants to the wide-
spread use of contraceptives in addition to liberalized abortion laws.
5. Adoption and Foster Care 1975. Hearings on Baby Selling Before the Subcomm. on Children
and Youth of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1975).
6. Dr. Richard Levin and attorney Katie Brophy "institutionalized" the first surrogate mother
matchmaking agency in Louisville, Kentucky. Surrogate Parenting Associates, Inc., evalu-
ates hundreds of surrogate mother applications and matches each qualified surrogate accord-
ing to the blood type and physical characteristics of the adopting mother. The institute
expects to be responsible for 100 births in 1981. Krucoff, Private Lives. The New Surrogates,
Wash. Post, Sept. 24, 1980, at B5, col. 2; Quindlen, Surrogate Mothers. A Controversial Solu-
tion to Infertility, N.Y. Times, May 27, 1980, at B12, col.l.
7. A Michigan attorney, Noel Keene, finds a surrogate for a couple, usually through a classified
ad, and arranges the adoption for a $3000.00 fee. Since Michigan law prohibits a payment in
connection with an adoption, Keene's surrogates are not paid consideration in excess of ex-
penses. See note 31 infra. An exception is a surrogate who agrees to bear a child for a
bachelor. Since the bachelor is the biological father an adoption is not necessary. See arti-
cles cited note 6 supra; White, Motherhood the 'Surrogate' Way. Practice has Pitfalls, Joys,
ScI. DIG., March 1980, at 24.
8. In some situations a friend or a relative has volunteered to serve as a surrogate mother. See
articles cited notes 6 & 7 supra.
9. See articles cited notes 6 & 7 supra; Seligmann & Curry, Pregnancy by Proxy, NEWSWEEK,
July 7, 1980, at 72; see Note, Contracts to Bear a Child, 66 CAL. L. R. 611 (1978).
10.. The wife of the biological father will need to adopt the child in formal proceedings in order
to acquire legal rights as mother. But see text accompanying notes 75-80 supra.
Adoption is not necessary for the husband, however, since he is the biological father. In
many states there are statutes which confer the same rights as legitimate children enjoy once
the father acknowledges his paternity. E.g., ALA. CODE § 26-11-2 (1977); CAL. PROB. CODE
§ 255 (West Supp. 1979); WIsC. STAT. ANN. § 237.06 (1957). Problems may arise, however,
if the biological father is required to prove paternity. See Note, supra note 9, at 614-616.
A perplexing situation may arise if ovum transplantation, see note IS infra, were used to
impregnate the surrogate mother. In this case the surrogate mother-is-not the biological
mother. Therefore, absent specific legislation, the courts may presume the surrogate mother
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type uses an ovum, or egg, of the surrogate mother, which is artificially
inseminated" with sperm from the husband of the adopting couple.'
2
As a result, the child's genetic or biological parents are the surrogate
and the husband of the adopting couple. 3 The second type employs an
ovum of the adopting mother.1" By the procedure of ovum transplan-
tation, the surrogate mother is impregnated with the fertilized ovum.'
5
In the latter type of surrogate mothering, the adopting couple is also
the child's biological parents.'
6
Surrogate mothering may be examined in three time periods: (1)
the period prior to and during the surrogate mother's pregnancy; (2) the
period after birth but prior to adoption; and (3) the period after formal
adoption. Legal issues may arise during any of the three periods. For
example, in the first period the actions of the parties to the surrogate
mother relationship may be considered adulterous under state law. In
addition, if the surrogate mother's actions are restricted by contract,
enforcement of these restrictions may require legal action. A contrac-
tual problem which may arise in the second period concerns the en-
forcement of the surrogate mother's and adopting couple's rights and
obligations under contract. Also during this period, the legitimacy of
the child may be a subject of challenge. Finally, issues may arise dur-
to be the biological mother thus requiring the adopting mother to prove that she is the bio-
logical mother.
I1. The introduction of semen (male fertilizing fluid) into the vagina or uterus by means of a
syringe or other instrument. If the semen is obtained from the husband, it is homologous
artificial insemination; if from another male, it is heterologous artificial insemination. I
SCHMIDT's ATTrORNEYs DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE A-306 (1968).
12. To provide a focused discussion of surrogate mothering, it is assumed that the adopting
couple is a heterologous married couple. It should be noted, however, that surrogate mother-
ing has been used to produce a child for a bachelor. Walz, Woman will be Surrogate Mother
for Single California Man, Mobile Press, Oct. 15, 1980, at 10-F, col. I.
13. This type of surrogate mothering is usually used when a woman has some reproductive inca-
pacity which prevents her from bearing children.
14. This type may be used either by a woman whose reproductive faculties are only partially
impaired or by women whose reproductive faculties are perfectly normal. An example of a
partial impairment would be damaged fallopian tubes, a history of miscarriages, incapability
of normal delivery, and women who have had hysterectomies but who still have functional
ovaries.
15. The ovum may be fertilized during normal sexual intercourse or by artificial insemination
and then transplanted to the surrogate mother, if the adopting mother's reproductive facul-
ties are not impaired. Otherwise, the ovum must be fertilized in vitro and then transplanted
to the surrogate mother.
There are five basic steps in ovum transplantation. First, the woman is either assayed for
urinary levels of luteinizing hormone every three hours around the time of ovulation to de-
termine her exact time of ovulation or a hormone, gonadotrophine, is injected to cause super-
ovulation. Second, the egg which has been ovulated into the fallopian tube is removed and
placed into a culture medium. Next, the ovum is incubated for 12 to 18 hours with sperm.
Then, after the egg has been fertilized, it is transferred to another culture medium for cleav-
age, and after it has reached the blastocyst stage, it is finally implanted into another woman's
uterus. See Test-tube Babies and the Law, 115 Sci. NEws 358 (1979).
16. Since surrogate mothering through ovum transplantation is not currently being applied, this
note will focus on the first type of surrogate mothering, that is, surrogate mothering through
artificial insemination. The procedures of in vitro fertilization and ovum transplantation,
however, have already been successfully performed. See note 15 supra; Kinney, Legal Issues
ofthe New Reproductive Technologies, 52 CAL. ST. B. J. 514, 519 (1977); Human Embryo
Research: Science and Ethics, 114 Sci. NEws 212 (1978).
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ing the second and third periods regarding the surrogate mother's re-
sponsibility toward the child. The question of legitimacy and the
surrogate mother's responsibility toward that child become particularly
acute, if for any reason adoption proceedings are not completed.
Clearly, the legal status of surrogate mothering is questionable
throughout all three periods.
A. Liability of Parties-Adultery
Although most common law definitions of adultery contemplate the
actual act of sexual intercourse,' 7 several focus on the surrendering of
the reproductive function.' 8 In jurisdictions that adopt this rule, parties
to the surrogate mother agreement may be civilly or criminally liable.
The first North American 9 case to hold that parties to artificial in-
semination commit adultery adopted the second definition. The Onta-
rio Supreme Court emphasized that the essence of adultery is the
voluntary surrender to another person of the reproductive functions of
a married person.2° Using this definition, the court reasoned that an
act other than sexual intercourse would constitute adultery, if it in-
vaded a married person's reproductive faculties; the court noted that
adultery does not require the moral turpitude inherent in the act of
sexual intercourse.2' This interpretation of the common law would in-
clude not only all acts held adulterous under the alternative definition
of adultery but also non-sexual acts, such as surrogate mothering.22
An Illinois court adopted the Ontario Supreme Court's interpreta-
tion of adultery in 1954.23 The court declared that heterologous artifi-
17. At common law adultery, was defined in terms of acts such as "the unfaithfulness of a mar-
ried person to the marriage bed," Copeland v. State, 108 Tex. Crim. 228, 300 S.W. 86, 91
(1927), or "a transgression against the marriage resolution," State v. Brooks, 215 Wis. 134,
254 N.W. 374, 375 (1934), rather than as a word with specific legal content. Later cases
interpreted these phrases to mean that the physical act of sexual intercourse is implicit.
Commonwealth v. Moon, 151 Pa. Super. Ct. 555, 30 A.2d 704 (1943); Beckwith v. Beckwith,
379 A.2d 955 (D.C. App. 1977).
People v. Sorenson, 68 Cal. 2d 280, 437 P.2d 495, 66 Cal. Rptr. 7 (1968), was the first
artificial insemination case to apply a definition of adultery based upon sexual intercourse.
The court held that absent legislation prohibiting artificial insemination, a child conceived
through artificial insemination is not the product of an illicit or adulterous relation. In dicta
the court noted that it is absurd to hold the doctor liable for adultery since the doctor may be
a woman, or the husband may administer the insemination by a syringe. At least one court
has adopted the Sorenson court's reasoning. In re Adoption of Anonymous, 74 Misc. 2d 99,
345 N.Y.S.2d 430 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
18. This interpretation would include some non-sexual acts as well as sexual intercourse. Orford
v. Orford, 58 D.L.R. 251 (1921). The Court had to resolve whether a woman who had agreed
to heterologous artificial insemination without her husband's consent had committed adul-
tery. The woman's claim of artificial insemination was rejected by the court, but in lengthy
dictum, the court discussed the issue of artificial insemination as adultery.
19. Orford v. Orford, 58 D.L.R. 251 (1921).
20. Id. at 258.
21. Id
22. Since the court considered heterologous artificial insemination, an integral part of surrogate
mothering, an act of adultery, it is logical to conclude that under this court's definition surro-
gate mothering would be adulterous.
23. Doornbos v. Doornbos, 23 U.S.L.W. 2308 (Cook County, I11. Super. Ct. Dec. 13, 1954), ap-
peal dismissed 12 Ill App. 2d 473 (1956).
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cial insemination, with or without the consent of the husband, is
contrary to public policy and good morals, and as such constitutes
adultery. 24 This interpretation of adultery, however, has not escaped
criticism. 25
B. The Surrogate Mother Contract
Advocates of surrogate mothering argue that careful contract con-
struction will alleviate foreseeable problems, such as injury to the sur-
rogate mother, undesirable actions of the surrogate mother, and
questions of custody.26 Nevertheless, many limitations on the surrogate
mother contract remain, including the permissible scope of the con-
tract, remedies for breach of contract, and statutory and public policy
limitations on the power to contract. These issues arise when the valid-
ity of the contract is challenged. For example, the adopting couple may
elect to terminate the agreement and thereby refuse to accept the child
or to honor such terms of the contract as payment for the surrogate
mother's medical expenses. Alternatively, the surrogate mother may
decide to keep the child. Problems may also arise at a later time, if the
state determines that the surrogate mother has parental responsibili-
ties 27 and she claims to have assigned these responsibilities by contract
to the adopting couple.
1. Limitations on the Power to Contract. Surrogate mothering con-
tracts may be found void under one of two theories. The contract may
violate state adoption laws if it involves a payment to the surrogate
mother.28 Alternatively, it may violate public policy.29
24. Id Homologous artificial insemination, however, was not included in the court's condemna-
tion.
The reasoning of the Canadian court was also applied in 1963 to determine whether a
child conceived through heterologous artificial insemination was a child born in wedlock.
The court found that the child was not. Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d
406 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
25. Dr. Wilfred Finegold suggests that under this definition a hysterectomy would preclude a
woman from committing adultery. W. FINEGOLD, ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION 72 (2d ed.
1976). Dr. Finegold, however, has missed the Orford court's distinction between reproduc-
tive powers and reproductive faculties. 58 D.L.R. 258.
Through its use of the terms reproductive powers and reproductive faculties, the court
was distinguishing between the ability to reproduce and the sexual organs of reproduction.
Although a hysterectomy eliminates the power to reproduce, not all of a woman's sexual
organs, reproductivefaculties, are removed during surgery. I SCHMIDT'S ATTORNEYS DiC-
TIONARY OF MEDICINE 311.71 (1968); ATTORNEY'S TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE 311.10 (3d ed.
1949).
A married woman who has sexual intercourse outside her marriage, therefore, would be
surrendering her reproductive faculties to someone other than her spouse and under the
Orford court's definition would be committing adultery. Since the Orford court's definition
of adultery proscribes the surrendering of one's reproductive powers or faculties, 58 D.L.R.
258, it would therefore include both sexual acts such as sexual intercourse and non-sexual
acts such as artificial insemination in its definition.
26. Note, supra note 9; Quindlen, supra note 6.
27. See text accompanying notes 68-80 infra.
28. See note 31 infra for an example of a statute; see also, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 273 (West
1967); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 4 § 9.1-21 (Smith-Hurd 1959); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 710.54
(West Supp. 1967). Katie Brophy, attorney for Surrogate Parenting Associates, Inc., believes
[Vol. 8:140
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All United States jurisdictions ban the sale of children.3" In fact,
many states have enacted statutes that expressly prohibit a person from
offering, giving, or receiving any money or other consideration in con-
nection with the placing of a child for adoption." Babies are not the
property of their parents and cannot be made the subject of barter.32
Violation of these statutes is a misdemeanor initially or a felony for
subsequent violations.33
It has been held that payment beyond expenses pursuant to a surro-
gate mother contract violates at least one state's statute prohibiting the
sale of adoption rights.34 The policy underlying this rule is to prevent
the commercialization of adoption and the problems that emerge from
such a trend.35
Although draftsmen of state adoption laws probably did not con-
template surrogate mothering, the policy considerations are very simi-
lar. Each state must amend its adoption laws in order to clarify its
position with respect to surrogate mothering.
Absent statutory limitations, a court may hold that a surrogate
mother contract is against public policy and therefore void. 36 The rule
applied in both state and federal courts is that agreements which tend
that Kentucky is the only state in the country that allows a fee to be paid to a surrogate
mother. Castillo, When Women Bear Childrenfor Others, N.Y. Times, Dec. 22, 1980, at B6,
col. 2. Kentucky Attorney General, Steven L. BeShear has issued an advisory opinion that
declares surrogate mother contracts illegal and unenforceable. 7 FAM. L. REP. (Bureau Nat.
Affairs) 2246 (Feb. 17, 1981). Although the attorney general declared a surrogate mother
contract void under Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 199.500(5) & 199.601(2) (1970), he also stated that
"the strongest legal prohibition against surrogate parenting in Kentucky is found in the
strong public policy against the buying and selling of children. Id at 2247.
29. See 17 C.J.S. Contracts §§ 211, 260, 265 (1963); 17 AM. JUR. 2d Contracts § 174-180 (1964);
15 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1744A (3d ed. 1972); A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 1374, 1375,
1447 to 1516; Downs v. Wortman, 228 Ga. 315, 315, 185 S.E.2d 387, 388 (1971). A contract
wherein a mother agrees to the adoption of her child by another in consideration of a mone-
tary payment to herself is void as against public policy. Doe v. Kelley, 11979-1981] REP.
HUMAN REPRO. L. (Legal-Med. Studies) at l-B-20.
30. Doe v. Kelley, [1979-1981] REP. HUMAN REPRO. L. (Legal-Med. Studies) 1I-B-15 (Wayne
County, Mich. Cir. Ct. Jan. 28, 1980).
31. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 710.54 (West Supp. 1980).
(1) Except for charges and fees approved by the court, a person shall not offer,
give, or receive any money or other consideration or thing of value in connection with
any of the following:
(a) the placing of a child for adoption
(b) the registration recording or communication of the existence of a child avail-
able for adoption or the existence of a person interested in adopting a child.
(c) a release
(d) a consent
(e) a petition.
32. In re Shirk's Estate, 186 Kan. 311, 350 P.2d 1 (1960); Parks v. Parks, 209 Ky. 127, 132, 272
S.W. 419, 422 (1928); Hooks v. Bridgewater, Ill Tex. 122, 131, 299 S.W. 1114, 1118 (1921);
67A C.J.S. Parent & Child § 16 (1978). See A. HOLDER, LEGAL ISSUES IN PEDIATRICS &
ADOLESCENT MEDICINE 7-8 (1977).
33. E.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 710.69 (West Supp. 1980); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 181
(West 1980).
34. Doe v. Kelley, [1979-1981] REP. HUMAN REPRO. L. (Legal-Med. Studies) at 11-B-22.
35. Expansion of the current adoption black market is one foreseeable problem. Personal profit
rather than social gain characterizes the goal of adoption Black marketeers. Turano, supra
note 4; see Podulski, supra note 4.
36. See note 29 supra.
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to be injurious to the public are illegal and void, although actual injury
from the agreement has not occurred. 37 The issue, then, is whether sur-
rogate mothering is potentially injurious and thus violative of public
policy.38
Of the many factors that play a role in determining whether surro-
gate mothering violates public policy, three are most important. The
first consideration is the biological mother's strong affection for her
child. A court is unlikely to overlook this bond when deciding whether
surrogate mothering is sound public policy. The law recognizes the
mother's claim to her child as a compelling natural right which derives
from the deepest instincts of motherhood. a9 Although the natural fa-
ther has a right of affection, the courts stress that when all factors are
equal, a mother's right is the more compelling."a In fact, a parent's
right of custody in a child, particularly the mother's, has been likened
to the inalienable rights of the Constitution.4 t
A second policy consideration is that surrogate mothering may lead
to exploitation of financially needy women.42 There will be some altru-
istic women who will volunteer as surrogates, 43 but as this supply is
depleted, remuneration will have to be paid to satisfy the demand for
surrogates. This fact is illustrated by the efforts of one attorney who,
after being informed by a juvenile court that surrogate mothers could
not be paid, experienced great difficulty in finding women willing to
37. 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 211 (1963); Custer Public Power Dist. v. Loup River Public Power Dist.
162 Neb. 300, 75 N.W.2d 619, 628 (1956).
38. The facts a court considers in determining whether adoptions violate public policy are illus-
trated in several cases. For example, in In re Adoption of P.J.K., 359 S.W.2d 360, 365 (Mo.
1962), a parent's agreement to ivade moral or legal responsibility to his child was held to be
against public policy. A Minnesota court held that an agreement which, in effect, transfers
from the natural mother to total strangers the right to keep, return or otherwise dispose of
her unborn child without further consent is void as contrary to public policy. State v. Wha-
ley, 246 Minn. 535, 75 N.W.2d 786 (1956).
It is not enough that the natural mother and the adopting parents are willing to consu-
mate an exchange. Willey v. Lawton, 8 I11. App. 2d 344, 132 N.E.2d 34 (1956).
39. State v. Whaley, 246 Minn. 535, 75 N.W.2d 786 (1956); Kingsbury v. Kingsbury, 75 N.Y.S.2d
699, 700 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
40. Miller v. Miller, 371 So. 2d 565 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Gravel v. Gravel, 355 So. 2d 1057
(La. Ct. App. 1978); "Maternal preference" should be expressed in limited instances where it
would be impossible to decide custody upon evidentiary facts. Cooke v. Cooke, 21 Md. App.
376, 319 A.2d 841 (Ct. Spec. App. 1974); Annot., A.L.R.3d 255.
41. State v. Whaley, 246 Minn. 535, 75 N.W.2d 786 (1956).
42. During hearings on in vitro fertilization before the Ethics Advisory Board of the Department
of Health, Education and Welfare, one witness testified that there was an "immediate possi-
bility of the exploitation of women surrogate mothers with wombs-for-hire, and [an] immedi-
ate [possibility] that we are going to begin to 'design' our descendants up to the limit that is
scientifically possible." Statement by Paul Ramsey, Professor, Princeton University, printed
in ETHICS ADVISORY BOARD, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, APPENDIX:
H.E.W. SUPPORT OF RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN IN VITRO FERTILIZATION AND EMBRYO
TRANSPLANT § 7, at 21 (May 4, 1979).
It should be noted, however, that poorly educated women and women on welfare or
public assistance are currently being rejected as surrogate mother candidates by Surrogate
Parenting Associates, Inc. OB/GYN NEWS, May I, 1980.
43. See notes 6-8 supra.
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become surrogates." The offer of remuneration will persuade
financially needy women to sell their reproductive faculties for the ben-
efit of others.
The price at which a woman will sell her reproductive faculties may
depend on her financial status.45 If the remuneration increases to stag-
gering amounts,46 a woman's choice to become.a surrogate mother may
lose its voluntary nature.47 This situation has great potential for use of
disproportionate bargaining power and, for this reason, it may be held
unconscionable and violative of public policy.
A final policy factor related to surrogate mothering is society's in-
terest in the preservation of the traditional family. The family unit has
been identified as the backbone of our society.4 8 As a result, any prac-
tice which threatens the stability of the family unit also threatens soci-
ety's stability. The issue, then, is whether the introduction of a third
party, the surrogate mother, substantially deviates from and threatens
the traditional family unit. If the courts view surrogate mothering as a
significant threat to the stability of the family unit,49 then they may
hold that surrogate mothering violates public policy and that any re-
lated contract is necessarily void.5
2. Scope of the Surrogate Contract. Many foreseeable problems
attendant to surrogate mothering can be alleviated by proper drafting
of surrogate mother contracts. If courts recognize the surrogate mother
contract as valid, the freedom of contract principle would grant a wide
latitude in contract terms. Unless a court finds fraud, duress, or illegal-
ity, it will not interfere with the contracting parties' power to create
rights and duties.5 This laissez-faire attitude has permitted a contract
whereby one party promised not to drink or use tobacco. 2 Similarly,
the adopting parents could contract to restrict the surrogate mother's
consumption of such commodities. Nonetheless, a contract must not
44. [1976-19781 REP. HUMAN REPRO. L. (Legal-Med. Studies) II-A-I; Hiring Mothers, TIME,
June 5, 1978, at 59.
45. A career woman would require much greater remuneration than an unemployed woman
since the former is giving up more to become a surrogate mother.
46. Fees to surrogate mothers have ranged from $5,000.00 to $13,000.00. Alsofrom, Physician
sees no problem in Surrogate Mother Business, AM. MED. NEws, June 20, 1980, at 17. But
some couples have stated that they are willing to pay from $40,000.00 to $50,000.00. Mc-
Cann, Surrogate Child-Bearing now Clinical Reality, MED. TRIBUNE, May 14, 1980, at 1.
47. It has been suggested that as the amount of payment increases, a surrogate mother's choice
may actually become involuntary. Doe v. Kelley, [1979-19811 REP. HUMAN REPRO. L. (Le-
gal-Med. Studies) i1-B-15 (Wayne County, Mich. Cir. Ct. Jan. 28, 1980).
48. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486
(1965); Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1887).
49. See note 105 infra.
50. Legislatures and courts in this country have continually expressed a desire to protect and
promote the nuclear family. See note 105 supra; Willey v. Lawton, 8 Il1. App. 2d 344, 132
N.E.2d 34 (1956).
5I. Braucher, Freedom ofContract and the Second Restatement, 78 YALE L.J. 598 (1969).
52. Hamer v. Sidway, 124 N.Y. 538, 27 N.E. 256 (1891). The issue on appeal, however, was
whether a promise to refrain from the consumption of alcohol and tobacco was sufficient
consideration. The court held that it was.
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become a contract for involuntary servitude53 or violate the surrogate
mother's constitutional right of privacy. 4
To protect the surrogate mother and child, state legislators may re-
quire insurance coverage as a condition of the contract. This contrac-
tual condition would merely codify current practice." By requiring the
adopting parents to insure all of the parties, both the surrogate mother
and the child would be secure against calamity. The surrogate
mother's life and health could be insured during pregnancy, childbirth,
and the stages following childbirth. Health insurance could be ob-
tained to insure support and maintenance of the child in the event that
he is born handicapped or retarded and the adopting parents refuse to
accept him. 6 Finally, the adopting parents' lives could be insured with
the child as beneficiary. In this manner, the child would have support,
if the adopting parents die during the surrogate mother's pregnancy.
3. Remedies for Breach of Contract. Breach of the surrogate
mother contract may be viewed from two perspectives. Remedies for
breach of contract against the adopting couple are easily fashioned. If
the adopting couple refuses to pay, the surrogate may sue the adopting
couple for the amount due pursuant to the contract. If the adopting
couple refuses to accept the child, the child can be placed in another
home through regular adoption procedures.
When the surrogate mother breaches the contract, however, fash-
ioning a remedy is more difficult. If the surrogate mother breaches the
contract by refusing to surrender the child, for example, it is unlikely
that a court will require specific performance. 7 Although this issue
remains unresolved in the United States, a court in England held that
in such a custody dispute the biological mother should prevail.5 8
53. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
54. See text accompanying notes 117-120 infra. Possible examples include whether a surrogate
mother can be compelled to undergo amniocentesis, a prenatal test for fetal abnormalities.
The test is conducted on a sampling of amniotis fluid which is removed from the mother by
inserting a hollow needle into the womb. A more extreme situation of a possible invasion of
privacy arises when the test result indicates a deformed child. It is highly questionable
whether the adopting couple could compel the surrogate mother to undergo an abortion.
55. Life and health insurance is currently included in many surrogate-mother contracts. Note,
supra note 9; Alsofrom, supra note 44, at 3.
56. Under some surrogate mother contracts, however, a refusal of acceptance by the adopting
couple would be a breach of contract. See Krucoff, supra note 6.
57. See Farnsworth, Legal Remediesfor Breach of Contract, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 1145 (1970).
While principles of contract prevent the arbitrary revocation of an adoption agreement en-
tered into by a natural parent, In re Adoption of D-, 122 Utah 525, 252 P.2d 223 (1953), in
proper circumstances the court will permit the natural parent to withdraw from, or repudiate
the agreement. Allen v. Morgan, 75 Ga. App. 738, 44 S.E.2d 500 (1947).
58. An unmarried couple employed a prostitute as a surrogate mother. The woman was artifi-
cially inseminated with the male's semen, but after birth the surrogate mother refused to
surrender the baby. The couple offered the surrogate £3000.00 and the extra inducements of
an £850.00 second-hand car and, in desperation, their house. The judge described the par-
ties' agreement as a pernicious contract for the sale and purchase of a child. It was held void,
and the surrogate mother was granted custody. Cusine, "Womb-Leasing" Some Legal Im-
plications, NEW L. J. 824 (1978); The Times (London) June 21, 1978, at 1, col. 8.
It should be noted that at press time, suit on a surrogate mother contract was pending in
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Creative contracting may avoid many of the problems associated
with surrogate mothering. The courts, however, may find the surrogate
mother contract in violation of state adoption laws or public policy and
therefore void. Surrogate mothering is a delicate issue whose results
are not easily reversed. For this reason, state legislatures must take
immediate action in order to eliminate confusion concerning surrogate
mothering contract rights and responsibilities.
C. Iflegitimacy
The legitimacy of a child delivered of a surrogate mother has not
been resolved. Illegitimacy may stigmatize the child socially and hin-
der his right of inheritance.5 9 Case law surrounding heterologous arti-
ficial insemination may be analogized to the surrogate mother
situation. Absent a statute specifically addressing the legitimacy issue,
a court may resort to one of three alternatives.6' First, the surrogate's
offspring may be presumed legitimate,6' if the surrogate mother was
married at the time of delivery.62 A majority of states have adopted
this rule.63 Second, if the surrogate mother was single at the time of
delivery and the court views her as the legal mother, then the surro-
gate's.offspring is clearly illegitimate.64 Finally, the court may find that
the child is legitimate regardless of the surrogate's marital status. This
situation may arise when the father is married and the court views his
the California courts. James Noyes of Rochester, New York filed suit against Denise Lucy
Thrane of Los Angeles, California to obtain custody of a child he fathered through artificial
insemination. Noyes v. Thrane, No. CF 7614 (L.A. County, Cal. Super. Ct., filed Feb. 20,
1981). Mrs. Thrane contracted to become a surrogate mother for the childless Noyes couple
and agreed to surrender the baby in exchange for payment of her medical bills. After con-
tracting, however, Mrs. Thrane changed her mind and now wants to keep the child. Mrs.
Thrane gave birth to a baby boy on April 4, 1981.
59. Note, Social and Legal Aspects of Human Artificial Insemination, 1965 Wis. L. REV. 859;,
Smith, Through a Test Tube Darkly Artoeial Insemination and the Law, 67 MICH. L. REV.
127 (1969).
Recent United States Supreme Court holdings, however, have reduced the impact of the
harsh treatment rendered illegitimate children by the common law. Gomez v. Perez, 409
U.S. 535 (1973); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968); Glona v. America Guarantee and
Liability Insurance Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968); see Krause, Equal Protectionfor the Illegitimate,
65 MICH. L. REV. 477 (1967).
60. Several states have enacted statutes legitimizing children conceived through heterologous
artificial insemination with the husband's consent. Eg., CAL. CIv. CODE § 7005 (West Supp.
1980); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73 (McKinney 1977); OKLA. STAT. ANN. 10 § 55a (Supp.
1977).
61. A child born in wedlock is presumed to be the child of the husband and is, therefore, legiti-
mate. London v. London, 78 Misc. 2d 535, 356 N.Y.S.2d 1000 (1974); Lewis v. LoChirco,
350 Ill. App. 394, 112 N.E.2d 917 (1953). E.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 621 (West Supp. 1977).
62. This alternative illustrates the status of children conceived through heterologous artificial
insemination and retained by the mother. Surrogate mothering only changes this situation in
that the child is not retained by the mother. If the surrogate mother is married, therefore, her
offspring should be characterized as legitimate even though she intends to give it up.
63. See Ray v. Bryant, 411 F.2d 1204, 1205 (5th Cir. 1969). At least 28 states have adopted this
presumption. E.g., Butler v. Butler, 254 Ala. 375, 48 So. 2d 318 (1950); People v. Russell, 22
Cal. App. 3d 330, 99 Cal. Rptr. 277 (1971); People v. Peters, 226 Ill. App. 512, 62 N.E.2d 139
(1945); London v. London, 78 Misc. 2d 535, 356 N.Y.S.2d 1000 (1974).
64. In this alternative the child is not the product of legally married parents. A similar situation
was addressed in C.M. v. C.C., 152 N.J. Super. 160, 377 A.2d 821 (1977).
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wife as the legal mother, although she is not the biological mother.65
The conflict between surrogate mothering and current legitimacy
law may also be resolved in states that provide for the legitimation of
illegitimate children through acknowledgement of paternity by the fa-
ther.66 This reasoning revolves around a judicial determination that
the legislature intended to include a surrogate mother's pregnancy
within the statute's scope. Finally, the problem of legitimacy may be
cured by formal adoption in most states. 67 State legislators must evalu-
ate surrogate mothering in light of the policy behind legitimacy laws
and amend their state's statutes accordingly.
D. Legal Identity of Mother
The identity and marital status of a baby's legal mother determines
whether the child is legitimate. Legal responsibility for the child's sup-
port also depends on the identity of the legal mother. Consideration,
therefore, must be given to the legal status of the surrogate mother.
Under certain conditions the surrogate mother may be held to be both
the biological mother and the legal mother. If an adopting mother
should die prior to formal adoption, the surrogate mother may replace
the adopting mother as the legal mother. 68 Similarly, if the natural fa-
ther's wife refuses to adopt the child formally and has not actively par-
ticipated in or consented to the child's birth, then the surrogate mother,
by virtue of her active participation, may satisfy the test of legal moth-
erhood.69  Finally, when the natural father is single, it is likely the
65. Under this alternative, the child is born into a couple who are its legal parents and who are
legally married. The requirements of legitimacy are thus satisfied. Generally, illegitmacy is
defined as the status of a child born of parents not legally married at the time of the child's
birth. People v. Sorenson, 68 Cal. 2d 280 (1968).
It is the policy of the law to favor the legitimacy of children and to declare them legiti-
mate if it can fairly support such a'declaration. Arcand v. Flemming, 185 F. Supp. 22 (D.
Conn. 1960); People v. Sorenson, 68 Cal. 2d 280 (1968); Annot., 25 A.L.R.3d 1093 (1969).
66. E.g., ALA. CODE § 26-11-2 (1977); CAL. PROB. CODE § 255 (West Supp. 1979); WIsc. STAT.
ANN. § 237.06 (1957).
In states which do not have these statutes, a surrogate's offspring can receive all the rights
of a legitimate child through formal adoption.
67. "Unless specific exceptions are provided by law, the effect of adoption is to establish as be-
tween the adoptive parents and the child all the rights and duties as normally exist between
the child and its natural parents." M. LEAVY & R. WEINBERG, LAW OF ADOPrTION 64 (4th
ed. 1979).
68. This could arise if the courts elect to follow the reasoning of C.M. v. C.C., 152 N.J. Super.
160, 377 A.2d 821 (1977). C.C., an unmarried woman, wanted a child and wanted C.M.,
C.C.'s paramour, to be the father. Since C.C., did not want to have intercourse before mar-
riage, and she was not ready to marry C.M., C.M. agreed to donate his semen. C.C. artifi-
cially inseminated herself, and as a result a child was conceived. After approximately the
third month of pregnancy, however, their relationship terminated and C.M. brought suit for
visitation rights.
The court held that a "known donor" of reproductive faculties is the legal parent, as well
as the natural parent, when the donee is without a consenting spouse. Consequently, as legal
parent C.M. was liable for support and, therefore, was granted visitation rights. Id. at 167-
168. If this reasoning is applied to surrogate mothering law, the surrogate mother would be
the legal mother when one of the conditions outlined in the text was satisfied and if the
surroate's identity was known.
69. Id The test for legal parenthood is discussed in the text accompanying notes 76-80 infra.
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courts will hold the surrogate mother liable as the legal mother.7 °
A surrogate mother does not contract with the intention of assum-
ing any duty or responsibility as the child's legal mother. In general, a
parent has an absolute obligation to support the child until the child
reaches majority age,7' but this obligation can be terminated by formal
adoption proceedings.72 The surrogate mother's obligation to support
the child, therefore, is terminated when the child is formally adopted.
In one state, however, the ultimate liability for child support would
remain with the surrogate mother after adoption by another, if the sur-
rogate mother is also the biological mother.73 Moreover, as biological
mother, the surrogate is subject to the child's claims to inheritance in at
least ten states.74 Thus, the surrogate mother may have to assume legal
liability for the child whose life she created.
Liability of the surrogate mother for child support turns upon the
distinction under heterologous artificial insemination75 law between a
biological parent and a legal parent. The developing legal concepts re-
lating to heterologous artificial insemination are relevant to the ques-
tion of the legal mother's identity, since that procedure is the male-
oriented counterpart of surrogate mothering. In this area the courts
70. This situation is the same as when any two people cause a child to be born. A parent has a
duty of support which cannot be terminated by contract. Culpepper v. Brewer, 242 Ga. 210,
248 S.E.2d 619 (1978). If the parent is "known," he will be held responsible even though the
child was conceived through artificial means. C.M. v. C.C., 152 N.J. Super. 160, 377 A.2d
821 (1977).
71. Prenzler v. Prenzler, 55 Ill. App. 3d 244, 370 N.E.2d 642 (1977). This obligation is "well nigh
absolute," Commonwealth ex rel. Kaplan v. Kaplan, 236 Pa. Super. 26, 344 A.2d 578 (1975).
See In re Marriage of O'Connell, 80 Cal. App. 3d 849, 146 Cal. Rptr. 26 (1978).
A parent is not released from this obligation by giving the child away. Hamm v. Hamm,
207 Kan. 431, 485 P.2d 221 (1971). Moreover, a parent's duty of support is not terminated
because he does not have custody or because the child is illegitimate. Gomez v. Perez, 409
U.S. 535, 536 & 538 (1973). A parent may not enter into an irrevocable contract which
relieves him of the duty to support. Culpepper v. Brewer, 242 Ga. 210, 248 S.E.2d 619
(1978). Although these cases concern support payments by fathers, both father and mother
are equally responsible for support. Carter v. Carter, 58 A.D.2d 438, 397 N.Y.S.2d 88 (1977).
72. Gessner v. Powell, 238 So. 2d 101 (Fla. 1970); In re Quantius' Will, 58 N.M. 807, 277 P.2d
306 (1954); Betz v. Horr, 276 N.Y. 83, 1I N.E.2d 548 (1937); Annot., 114 A.L.R. 491 (1938).
73. The Illinois Supreme Court stated that "[a]n adoption of a child does not work a complete
severance of the relationship between the child and its natural parents. The duty of a parent
to support his minor child arises out of the natural relationship, and while that duty may also
be imposed upon the adoptive parents by statutory enactment, the natural parent may, if
necessity arises, be required to perform that duty." Dwyer v. Dwyer, 336 Ill. 630, 634, 10
N.E.2d 344, 346 (1937). This holding has been repeatedly upheld. People ex rel. Bachleda v.
Dean, 48 Ill. 2d 16, 268 N.E.2d II (1971); Anderson v. Anderson, 320 Ill. App. 140, 49
N.E.2d 841 (1943). See also Huckaby v. Huckaby, 75 111. App. 3d 195, 393 N.E.2d 1256
(1979); Cessna v. Montgomery, 28 Ill. App. 3d 887, 329 N.E.2d 861 (1975).
74. Since adoption terminates all legal relationships between biological parent and child, the
general rule is that, in the absence of specific statutory provision, the child does not have a
right of inheritance against this biological parents. A number of states, however, have spe-
cific provisions in their statutes giving the adopted child such a right of inheritance.- States
with such provisions are Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Texas, Vermont, and West Virginia. LEAVEY & WEINBERG, at 65 supra note 65.
In Iowa the courts have held that, absent specific statutes, the child may inherit from its
biological parents under common law. Snook v. Herrmann, 161 N.W.2d 185, 190 (Iowa Sup.
Ct. 1968).
75. See note I1 supra.
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have held that a husband of a woman artificially inseminated, though
not the biological father, can make himself the legal father by his acts
and representations.76 A biologically noncontributing husband may be
considered the legal father, if he "actively participated and con-
sented"77 to his wife's conception of a child by means of artificial in-
semination." Under this theory, if the husband is found to be the legal
father, he is then liable for the child's support.7 9
A similar distinction between biological mother and legal mother
may be made as law regarding surrogate mothering develops. By anal-
ogy, it is reasonable to conclude that the biological father's wife will be
held accountable as the legal mother, if she "actively participates and
consents" to the conception of a child by means of surrogate mother-
ing. The designation of the biological father's wife as the legal mother
provides a second source of support and maintenance, if something
should happen to the father. Additionally, it may remove the stigma of
illegitimacy from the surrogate's offspring if the court views the child's
birth as a product of a couple who are the baby's legal parents and who
are lawfully married."0
II. PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS
The psychological and social effects of surrogate mothering must be
considered when formulating legislation. Since surrogate mothering is
on the cutting edges of both science and law, there have been very few
empirical studies of its consequences. Psychological and sociological
studies have focused on two important aspects of surrogate mothering:
heterologous artificial insemination and adoption.8'
A. Psychological Impact on the Child
The complex psychological impact of surrogate mothering is best
understood when viewed from the separate perspectives of the child,
76. The first case to draw a distinction between the biological father and the legal father was
Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963). Being unable to
consumate the marriage, the husband agreed that his wife should be artificially inseminated
with the semen of a third-party donor. Although the husband was not the child's biological
father, by applying theories of equitable estoppel and implied contract, the court held that
the husband was the legal father. Id at 1089.
77. People v. Sorenson, 68 Cal. 2d 280, 437 P.2d 495, 66 Cal. Rptr. 7 (1968), expanded the con-
cept of a legal father. Like Gursky, supra note 76, the husband in Sorenson consented to the
artificial insemination of his wife with semen from a third-party donor. The court held that
the husband was the legal father since he actively participated and consented to his wife's
artificial insemination. 68 Cal. 2d at 285
78. The policy underlying these holdings is that one who actively participates and consents to
one's wife's artificial insemination cannot create a temporary relation to be assumed and
disclaimed at will. Instead, the arrangement must be of a long term character which imposes
an obligation of supporting those for whose existence one is directly responsible. 68 Cal. 2d
at 285.
79. 68 Cal. 2d 280; Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc. 2d at 1089.
80. Legitimacy is defined and discussed in the previous section. For the common law definition
of legitimacy see note 65 supra.
81. See notes 10 & 11 supra.
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the surrogate mother, and the adopting parents. A primary considera-
tion, of course, is the psychological welfare of the child. According to
several experts, discovery of his status as a surrogate mother's offspring
before the child is mature enough to accept such a realization may
cause severe psychological damage. s2 A less dramatic but more proba-
ble result is that the child will have doubts about his parentage.8 3 The
child's belief that the woman acting as his mother shared his genetic
and psychological make-up would be shattered, possibly causing feel-
ings of insecurity. 4 Furthermore, if surrogate mothering has any ad-
verse effect upon the adopting couple's relationship, the child may
detect that familial disharmony is caused by his presence and may suf-
fer emotionally. These considerations, however, are counterbalanced
by the accepted principle of adoption which has similar characteristics
and has suffered many of the same criticisms.85 In addition, when con-
fronting psychological turmoil, offspring of a surrogate mother will
have the advantage, unlike many other children, of being wanted.
B. Psychological Impact on the Surrogate Mother
To understand the psychological impact on the surrogate mother,
one must understand why someone becomes a surrogate mother. Rea-
sons for wanting to become a surrogate may vary from an altruistic
desire to share the gift of life to pure economic motivation. 6 In the
words of Dr. Philip Parker, an instructor in the Department of Psychia-
try at Wayne State University:
Many women like to be pregnant because it gives them a feeling of
power. They are creating a new life, something no man can do. For
others, pregnancy is the last word in femininity. Another group re-
sponds to a symbiotic, nuturing relationship with the fetus. And a
small percentage look upon pregnancy as a punishment.8 7
A surrogate mother's psychological stability depends upon her motive
82. With regard to heterologous artificial insemination, most doctors feel that the identity of the
biological father should be kept as a secret between the couple and their doctor. Atallah,
Report From a Test-Tube Baby, N.Y. Times, April 18, 1976, § 6 (Magazine), at 16; Curie-
Cohen et al., Current Practice of Arti#ciai Insemination by Donor in the United States, 300
NEW ENGLAND J. MED. 589 (1979). One doctor has stated that if the child should discover
any irregularity in his parentage, psychological damage could be disasterous, and an inferi-
ority complex could result that psychoanalysis could not cure. Atallah, supra at 17.
Surrogate Parenting Associates, Inc. refuses to disclose the identity of the surrogate
mother to the adopting couple. Krucoff, supra note 6; Quindlen, supra note 6. On the other
hand, an attorney in Michigan encourages the surrogate mother and the adopting couple to
become acquainted. See Seligmann & Curry, Pregnancy by Proxy, NEWSWEEK, July 7, 1980,
at 72.
83. See C. DALY, MORALS, LAW AND LIFE 168 (1966).
84. At least one situation, however, indicates that such a discovery would not be disasterous. A
child who was the product of heterologous artificial insemination stated that knowing about
her origin did nothing to alter her feelings for her family. Atallah, supra note 81, at 48.
85. One difference, however, is that the adopted child has already been born, while the surrogate
mothering offspring is purposely being created.
86. White, Motherhood the 'Surrogate' Way.- Practice has Pitfalls, Joys, Sci. DIG., March 1980, at
26.
87. 1d
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for becoming a surrogate.8 8 A woman who volunteers as a surrogate
mother for purely altruistic reasons may adjust easily and even experi-
ence joy when she surrenders her offspring to the adopting couple. A
woman who becomes a surrogate mother to achieve a feeling of power
or for the other reasons which Dr. Parker suggests, however, could suf-
fer a profound sense of loss when the child is relinquished.89 Regard-
less of the surrogate mother's reason for volunteering, payment beyond
expenses may exacerbate any negative psychological effects.90
C. The Adopting Couple
Possible adverse psychological effects of surrogate mothering on the
adopting mother revolve around her nonparticipatory role in the
child's creation.9 An impariment of one's sexual or procreative ability,
alone, is likely to have a dramatic psychological effect;9 2 this insecurity
may be intensified when the unimpaired spouse creates and brings a
new life into the relationship without her biological participation.93
This possibility, however, must be balanced against the thrill of having
a family that is genetically related to one of the spouses. 94
The infertile wife may experience doubt because her husband's
child develops in another woman's body.95 She may, consequently, de-
velop feelings of jealousy and animosity for the surrogate mother.96
Moreover, the child's discovery of the facts surrounding his birth may
result in the isolation of the wife in the familial relationship. This situ-
ation clearly differs from traditional adoption. In traditional adoption
neither spouse contributes to the biological character of the child, and
therefore, each parent has an equal position with the child.
The father's psychological well-being may also be threatened by
surrogate mothering. If the identity of the surrogate is kept anony-
mous, the father may develop a covert attraction for her and expend
energy fictionalizing her character.97 In addition, the father may con-
centrate his love on the child, thereby excluding the wife from the fa-
milial relationship.98 Alternatively, as the child matures the father may
resent the child or develop guilt feelings with the realization that his
88. See Krucoff supra note 6; Quindlen supra note 6. For this reason, Dr. Levin of Surrogate
Parenting Associates, Inc. subjects his surrogate mother candidates to a thorough psychologi-
cal examination.
89. White, supra note 86. Surrendering the child she has carried for nine months and sacrificed
for, the surrogate mother's psychological upheaval will be nothing short of traumatic. Id
90. See notes 45-47 supra.
91. The discussion in this paragraph assumes that the reproductive capabilities of the adopting
mother are impaired so that she cannot contribute biologically to the creation of the child.
92. Note, Social and Legal Aspects of Human Arti/cial Insemination, 1965 Wis. L. REV. 859
nn.38, 868 nn. 41 & 879 tn. 100.
93. See Rubenstein, Little-Known Hazards ofAID: Disease, Inbreeding, Guilt, PsYcH. TODAY,
May 1980, at 23.
94. See text accompanying notes 11-13 supra.
95. See note 86 supra.
96. These feelings may ultimately affect her relationship with her child.
97. See C. DALY, supra note 83.
98. The reverse situation has been proposed in the heterologous artificial insemination proce-
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satisfaction in the child might not be shared by his spouse. These feel-
ings may be intensified by the presence of the child, especially if the
surrogate mother was not selected with attention to the physical charac-
teristics of the adopting mother. The father's psychological welfare
must, once again, be balanced against the unique excitement of sharing
in the creation of life where none was previously possible.
D. Sociological Effects
The psychological implications are but a single component of the
total sociological impact of surrogate mothering. Legislatures, as
guardians of the public health, safety, morals, and general welfare, le-
gitimately may consider the effects of surrogate mothering on society.
Surrogate mothering, to the extent that it affects the social structure by
its impact on family structure, is within the legislative prerogative.
There are people who view the divorce of reproduction from the
marital union as the single greatest threat to the family's continued
existence, and oppose surrogate mothering for this reason.99 Although
surrogate mothering is desirable on the grounds that it provides adopt-
able infants where they were previously unavailable or only available
after a wait of three to seven years, " it may also lay the foundation for
the dissolution of the family.
The principle underlying surrogate mothering is that a womb exter-
nal from the marital union may be permissibly employed for human
reproduction. By analogizing to this principle, later generations may
justify the use of a separate and independent artificial womb which will
be perfected and will permit all women to forego natural pregnancy, if
they chose to do so.' 0i If, as a result of changing social values concern-
ing motherhood versus career aspirations, surrogate mothering be-
comes widespread,"' personal involvement will be severed from
reproduction.'0 3 It has been suggested that this may mark the end of
dure. Dienes, Arificial Donor Insemination.- Perspectives on Legal and Social Change, 54
IOWA L. REV. 253 (1968).
99. P. Riga, Humane Vitae andthe New Sexuality, TRIUMPH, 18 (Oct. 1973); C. DALY, supra note
83, at 164-165; See generally D. CALLAHAN, THE TYRANNY OF SURVIVAL (1975); . REILY,
GENETICS, LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY (1977).
100. It has been noted, however, that "undiscriminating attempts to give children to the childless
can in many cases produce results detrimental to the welfare of society." Commentary, Arti-
ficial Insemination. Problems, Policies, and Proposals, 26 ALA. L. REV. 120, 126 n.31 (1973).
See also note 5 supra.
101. The E.M.D. (extracorporeal membrane oxygenator or in other words, artificial womb) has
supported life in three dozen lambs for up to two and a half days. R. FRANCOEUR, UTOPIAN
MOTHERHOOD (1970). Dr. Daniele Petrucci fertilized a human egg in vitro and kept the
resulting embryo alive in an artificial environment for twenty-nine days. Id at 57. The
development of the 'perfect' artificial placenta and womb appears to be merely a matter of
time. Id. at 56.
102. Dr. Herman J. Muller states: "Foster pregnancy, which is already possible, will become
socially acceptable and even socially obligatory. It will seem wrong to breed children who
mirror parents' pecularities and weaknesses. In the future, children will be produced by the
union of ovum and sperm, both derived from persons of proved worth, possible long de-
ceased, and who exemplify the ideals of the foster-parents. C. DALY, supra note 83, at 164.
103. See C. DALY, supra note 83, at 165.
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the traditional family.I 4 The bleakness of such a possibility, of course,
must be contrasted with the idea that a family can still exist and per-
form its vital function in society even though a wife does not perform
her traditional role as child-bearer.
The essential contribution of the family lies in teaching role behav-
ior through socialization. 0 5 By passing the cultural traditions of one
generation on to the next, family members gain an understanding of
their identity in society.t°6 If society accepts a practice which threatens
the stability of the familial institution, society must then replace the
family with a new means of socialization. Failure to employ a new
means of socialization could cause the loss of social identity and the
eventual collapse of that society.
Legislators must determine whether surrogate mothering presents a
threat to the family and its socializing functions, and based upon their
conclusion, draft correlative legislation. Unless legislators draft legisla-
tion which protects society from any destructive effects of surrogate
mothering, they should be prepared to replace the family with an alter-
native socializing force.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON LEGISLATIVE POWER
This note recommends enactment of legislation clarifying the status,
rights, and liabilities of all parties affected by surrogate mothering.
When drafting this legislation, however, a legislature must be aware of
the constitutional limitations on its power. Individual rights that
supercede legislative power include the recently created right to pri-
vacy. A constitutionally based right of privacy was first recognized by
the United States Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut.'O7 The
Court recognized a privacy zone created by several fundamental consti-
tutional guarantees. 0 8 Although the parameters of this zone were not
defined, it was held to extend at least to the intimate decisions regard-
ing child-bearing."0 In a later case the Court decided that if the right
of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual to decide,
free from unwarranted governmental intrusion, whether to bear a
child.110 Although the concept of privacy is instinctively appealing, the
boundaries of the right of privacy remain uncertain more than a decade
104. See note 99 supra.
105. See Dienes, supra note 98; State v. Koome, 84 Wash. 2d 901, 530 P.2d 260 (1975); Noonan,
The Family and the Supreme Court, 23 CATH. UNIV. L. REV. 255 (1973).
106. Id
107. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). The United States Supreme Court reversed a conviction under a Con-
necticut statute which made the use of contraceptives a criminal offense. The Court held that
the statute was invalid as invading a couple's constitutional right of privacy. See Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
108. 381 U.S. at 485.
109. Id
110. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972). The United States Supreme Court held that a
Massachusetts statute which made it a felony for anyone to give away a drug, medicine,
instrument, or other article for the prevention of conception except a registered physician or
pharmacist was unconstitutional.
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after Griswold."'
The constitutionality of surrogate mothering legislation will be
tested by one of two standards. If it is determined that surrogate moth-
ering legislation encroaches upon a fundamental right, the state will
then be required to satisfy the "compelling state interest test."' 12 This
test requires the state to overcome two hurdles: the legislation must be
both necessary and directed towards achieving a compelling state inter-
est." 3 If a fundamental right is not implicated, the state then will have
only to satisfy the "rationally related test.""' 4 Under this test the con-
templated legislation need only be rationally related to the achievement
of a permissible state interest. I " Traditionally, states prevail under the
rationally related test but rarely prevail under the compelling state in-
terest test.116
The issue, then, is whether surrogate mothering involves a funda-
mental right. Fundamental rights are rooted in the express guarantees
of the Constitution and in the implied guarantees that flow from these
guarantees. "7 The latter guarantees are not to be found in any
Supreme Court decision. Instead, the Supreme Court enumerates
rights previously upheld as fundamental and then decides whether the
claimed right is sufficiently similar to warrant protection."'
Although a surrogate mother's decision to become pregnant paral-
lels the fundamental right of reproductive privacy, the adopting
couple's claimed right of reproductive privacy does not appear to be
Ill. The Court's most comprehensive attempt, thus far, to define this right came in Whalen v.
Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977). The Court stated that the right of privacy encompassed something
beyond the lease common denominator of the Court's prior decisions with respect to marital
choice, procreation, contraception, and child rearing. The right embraces both a general
"individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters" and a similarly general, but
nonetheless distinct "interest in independence in making certain kinds of important deci-
sions." Id at 599-600. See generally Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 233 (1977); Note, A Taxonomy of Privacy. Repose, Sanctuary, and Intimate Decision, 64
CAL. L. REV. 1447 (1976); Note, Roe and Paris.- Does Privacy have a Principle?, 26 STAN. L.
REV. 1161 (1974).
112. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361
U.S. 516, 524 (1960). This test was applied previously in equal protection cases involving
either suspect classifications or fundamental interests. See Gunther, The Supreme Court,
1971 Term-Foreward In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Modelfor a
Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8-10 (1973).
113. See Comment, Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Boelton: The Compelling State Interest Test in Sub-
stantive Due Process, 30 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 628, 639-42 (1973).
114. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
115. The state is permissibly concerned with the health and welfare of the child. The necessity of
state's interest is exemplified by one surrogate mother's statement that she did not consider
the child as hers. Quindlen, It's the Father's Child-I am Simply Growing it for Him, N.Y.
Times, May 27, 1980, at B 12, Col. 2. Because of such attitudes, the state may rightly require
a minimum standard of care for the child.
The state also has a permissible interest in the mother. Without state regulation, surro-
gate mothers may be exploited through coercion and duress. See notes 44-47 supra. Finally,
the state has a permissable interest as parens patriae. See Wynn v. Carey, 582 F.2d 1375,
1386 (7th Cir. 1978); State v. Koome, 84 Wash. 2d 901, 530 P.2d 260 (1975).
116. See Gunther, note 112 supra.
117. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 484.
118. E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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sufficiently similar. The emphasis in reproductive privacy is on the
right of the individual to control his or her own reproductive facul-
ties.' 9 To give a second party the right to control another person's
reproductive faculties, therefore, would be contradictory. Under this
theory, although a surrogate mother's decision to become pregnant is a
fundamental right, another party would not have the right to contract
for control of the pregnancy. The only case to date that addresses sur-
rogate mothering, Doe v. Kelley, adopted this conclusion. 120
In summary, a showing of both a compelling state interest and ne-
cessity would be required in order to legislate with respect to the surro-
gate mother's decision; however, there does not appear to be a
fundamental right to employ a surrogate mother.' 2' If this conclusion
is accepted by the courts, legislators may constitutionally regulate those
activities of the adopting couple that rationally relate to a state interest.
IV. CONCLUSION
The practical result of legislative inattention to the emerging area of
scientifically controlled reproduction is that the determination of social
policy shifts to the biological researcher. As a democratic society, how-
ever, we have entrusted our legislatures with the task of determining
which social goals should be pursued. This task can only be accom-
plished by direct confrontation with questions of social concern.
State legislators face three alternatives concerning surrogate moth-
ering: surrogate mothering can be legislatively forbidden; fully sanc-
tioned; or tolerated with an intermediate level of regulation.
Constitutional guarantees and practical considerations preclude ex-
treme reactions-selection of either of the first two alternatives. The
right of privacy protects an individual's decision to become pregnant.
As a result, legislation which forbids certain women from becoming
pregnant in anticipation that they will become surrogate mothers is
constitutionally unsound. 22 Similarly, both the constitutional ban on
the sale of children and common law principles of public policy seem
to preclude the sanctioning of surrogate mothering for profit. Legisla-
tors should pursue the third alternative. Surrogate mothering should
be regulated within constitutional bounds.
The legislation which is adopted may either stimulate or discourage
119. 1d; United States v. Caesar, 368 F. Supp. 328, 334 (D. Wis. 1973); Eichbaum, Towards an
Autonomy--Based Theory of Constitutional Privacy: Beyond the Ideology of Familial Privacy,
14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 361 (1979); see Noonan, supra note 105.
120. [1979-1981] REP. HUMAN REPRO. L. (Legal-Med. Studies) 1-B-15, Il-B-18 (Wayne County,
Mich. Cir. Ct. 1980).
121. This does not address the separate and distinct issue of whether a mother has a right to
determine who may adopt her children. Even if the courts hold that there is such a right,
surrogate mothering legislation would not be unconstitutional unless it attempts to totally
eliminate transfer of custody. Laws prohibiting the payment of money to the surrogate
would not be unconstitutional.
122. Aside from violating a woman's right to privacy, an equal protection problem also surfaces
since legislation of this type involves invidious discrimination.
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surrogate mothering. For example, a legislature may decide that pay-
ment of expenses, including hospital costs, doctor fees, attorney fees,
lost wages,123 and other reasonable costs, is permissible. On the other
hand, a legislature may deny any payment to the surrogate mother,
including expenses. The latter response would merely give a mother
the right to control the placement of her adoptable child. On the spec-
trum of regulated surrogate mothering, this restrictive stance is most
desirable since it accomplishes the beneficial ends of surrogate mother-
ing and avoids the detrimental ends. Restrictive legislation, legislation
denying any payment to the surrogate mother, permits altruistic wo-
men to become surrogate mothers and provide children to otherwise
childless couples while preventing the degradation of child-bearing into
a mercenary profession which exploits financially needy women.
124
Regardless of the posture selected, the legislature should clarify its
adultery and illegitimacy laws, as they apply to surrogate mothering.
All parties involved in surrogate mothering are entitled to know the
legal consequences of their actions.
Perry J. Vieth*
123. At least one case has implied that a mother may be able to recover lost wages as an expense.
Las Vegas Sun v. Franklin, 74 Nev. 282. 292, 329 P.2d 867, 872 (1958). This practice, how-
ever, is very close to paying the surrogate mother a "profit" for her services.
124. See notes 42-47 supra and accompanying text.
$ B.S., Marquette University, 1979; J.D. Candidate. Notre Dame Law School, 1982.
19811
